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Interlinked Credit and its Effects on Farm Intensification in Kenya 
Abstract  
This paper addresses the potential for interlinked credit/input/output marketing arrangements for 
particular cash crops to promote food crop intensification.  Using panel survey data from Kenya, 
we estimate a household fixed-effects model of fertilizer use per hectare of food crops.  Results 
indicate that households engaging in interlinked marketing programs for selected cash crops 
applied considerably greater fertilizer on other crops (primarily cereals) not directly purchased by 
the cash crop trading firm.  These findings suggest that, in addition to the direct stimulus that 
interlinked cash crop marketing arrangements can have on small farmer incomes, these 
institutional arrangements may provide spillover benefits for the productivity of the farmers’ other 
activities such as food cropping. 
 
1.  Introduction  
  Meeting the challenge of raising rural incomes in Africa will require some form of 
transformation out of the semi-subsistence, low-input, low-productivity farming systems that 
currently characterize much of rural Africa.  High-valued cash crops represent one potential 
avenue of crop intensification.  Evidence indicates that, where agro-ecological and infrastructural 
conditions are favorable, smallholders can raise their agricultural productivity and incomes by 
engaging in commercialized crops with coordinated input, credit, and output marketing systems 
(von Braun and Kennedy 1994; Little and Watts, 1994; Kelly et al., 1996; Dorward, Kydd, and 
Poulton 1998).  However, staple food crops continue to account for the bulk of area cultivated in 
most African countries, and increasing the productivity of these food crops remains a major 
development priority. 
  A major research question concerns the effect of engaging in commercialized cash crops 




food crops for scarce land and may jeopardize households’ ability to feed themselves particular 
when markets fail.  However, there is some evidence indicating that participation in cash crop 
schemes can improve households’ access to crop inputs and training that provide “spillover” 
benefits to their food crops (Goetz, 1993; Govereh and Jayne, 2003).  Thus, in addition to the 
direct effect of cash cropping on household incomes, there may be important indirect effects of 
cash cropping on the productivity of other household activities such as food cropping.  These 
potential synergies between cash crops and food crops have been generally neglected in food crop 
research and extension programs, although they may have important implications for programs 
designed to promote smallholder food crop productivity growth. 
  This paper measures the potential synergies between interlinked cash cropping schemes 
and intensification of fertilizer use on food crops.   Interlinked schemes are programs where 
farmers receive inputs on loan from farmers and pay back the loan through sale of the crop at 
harvest.  Credit, input supply, and output sale are “interlinked” in one transaction (Gangopadhyay 
and Sengupta, 1987; Hayami and Otsuka, 1993).  Our analysis focuses on the case of interlinked 
smallholder crop marketing programs for sugarcane, coffee, and tea in Kenya. 
  Findings suggest that participation in interlinked cash crop schemes has enabled small 
farmers in Kenya to acquire key inputs that allow them to substantially increase the level of 
fertilizer on crops other than the ones featured in commercialized marketing schemes.  A better 
understanding of why and how these synergies occur can help in the design of policy strategies to 
intensify food crop production in Africa. 
 




  Analysis is based on a two-year panel of rural household surveys in 1997 and 2000.
1  In 
April 1997, a total of 1,540 households were randomly selected within the eight provinces of the 
country, using a sampling frame derived from the Central Bureau of Statistics.  In May 2000, 1,422 
of these households were located and surveyed (attrition rate was 5.2%). 
  In Kenya, interlinked credit (ILC) is provided to small farmers mainly by firms purchasing 
and processing commercialized crops, e.g., coffee, tea, sugarcane, and horticulture.  Because of 
large variations in agro-ecological environments across regions, we restrict our analysis to areas 
where ILC is available.  We selected villages where at least one household received interlinked 
credit in either survey year.  As a result of this procedure, 61 villages containing 825 households 
were selected (Table 1). 
 
3.  Spillover Effects of Interlinked Credit on Fertilizer Use on Other Crops 
Pathways for Spill Over Effects 
  A purchasing or processing firm provides fertilizer on credit under an understanding that 
producers will sell their produce to the same firm after a harvest.  Then, the firm takes out the cost 
of fertilizer and implicit interest rates from the sales of the produce, often together with other 
associated costs such as processing and marketing costs.  There is a possibility that producers 
strategically default by selling their produce to firms that did not provide fertilizer to them.  
Typical examples, such as cotton production in Pakistan, are illustrated in Dorward, Kydd, and 
Poulton (1998).  To avoid such strategic default problems, firms in Kenya use past sales records to set the 
credit limits for the future.  For instance, coffee cooperatives set the credit limit to a producer at the 
average sales of the past three years.  This incentive scheme gives producers an incentive to keep 
selling their produce to the same firm if they want to obtain in-kind credit in the future.  This 
                                                           
1 These surveys were designed and implemented under the Kenya Agricultural Marketing and Policy 




scheme could be more effective to prevent strategic defaults among coffee and tea producers who 
need to maintain a log-term contract with local purchasing and processing firms than among 
producers who are looking for myopic profits.   
  When fertilizer is provided on credit, how does such credit on commercialized crops have 
spill over effects to non-ILC crops?  We consider the following pathways: (a) the direct physical 
diversion pathway, (b) the budget expansion pathway, and (c) the learning-by-doing pathway, and 
(d) the input-market development pathway.  In Table 2, we summarize the following discussions 
on pathways.  The first pathway, the direct physical pathway, takes place when types of fertilizer 
provided via ILC are appropriate for non-ILC crop production.  For instance, UREA and DAP 
provided by coffee cooperatives, sugarcane firms, and horticulture traders can directly be applied 
on many non-ILC crops, such as maize.  In contrast, tea firms provide NPK, which is not 
appropriate to use on most non-ILC crops.  The direct physical diversion of fertilizer will be 
limited, however, because producers need to maintain the ILC crop production at a high level to 
obtain a high level of credit in the future.  Note, however, that this physical diversion will increase 
fertilizer use on non-ILC crops only when producers are facing the credit constraint and when 
costs of fertilizer on credit are higher than market prices of fertilizer, i.e., a positive interest rate on 
fertilizer on credit.  Recently, many firms provide fertilizer on credit not just for the ILC crop, but 
for food crops as well.  The rationale is that participating farmers may increase their area to cash 
crops if they can satisfy their basic food requirements by using less land (Nyoro 2001). 
  The second pathway, the budget expansion pathway, will also have positive impacts on 
fertilizer use on non-ILC crops when ILC-producers are facing the credit constraint.  When 
produces are facing the credit constraint, then producers no longer need to allocate limited 
resources between fertilizers on ILC and non-ILC crops.  Thus, they can devote more resources to 




  The third pathway, the learning-by-doing pathway, also plays a larger role when types of 
fertilizers applied on ILC crops are appropriate for non-ILC crops.  By applying fertilizer on ILC 
crops, producers become familiar with the particular fertilizers and start applying them on other 
crops.  
  The last pathway, the input market development pathway, which is first illustrated by 
Goetz (1993), is that in areas with high values crops such as all ILC crops, the input markets for 
those high value crops develop over time.  Because of a high demand for fertilizer by high value 
crop producers, traders can bring in large amounts of fertilizer to rural areas with a low unit cost.  
Thus, low fertilizer prices encourage farmers to apply fertilizer on non-ILC crops.  This pathway, 
however, is a long-term development and this paper, which uses a three-year panel, is not suitable 
to analyze it.  Thus, we focus on the first three pathways in the following analysis.        
 
Descriptive Analysis 
  To examine these potential pathways, we first stratified the sample into two groups, poor 
and non-poor, based on their 1997 asset values.  Assuming that poor households are more likely to 
face the credit constraint, this stratification is intended to explore the first and second pathways.  
To examine the impacts of ILC on these two groups, we further stratified the sample into four 
groups based on credit status in 1997 and 2000.  The first group received credit neither in 1997 or 
2000.  The second group received ILC in 2000 only, while the third group received credit in 1997 
only.  The last group received credit both in 1997 and 2000.  We name these four groups “Neither,” 
“Enter”, “Exit” and “Both”, respectively.  Changes in households’ use of ILC between the two 
periods provide an opportunity to estimate the effects of credit. 
The Kenya national level data indeed support an increase in total fertilizer use in Kenya 
from 1997 to 2000.  Indeed, we find an increase in fertilizer use from 1997 to 2000 among our 




four crops (coffee, tea, sugarcane, and vegetables) for which interlinked credit could be given.  We 
measure fertilizer use as kilograms of nutrients.  Nutrient use is a better indicator of soil 
enhancement than the quantity of fertilizer because nutrient-to-weight ratios differ between 
fertilizer types.   
Table 3 shows that the nutrient use has increased from 1997 to 2000 among all four 
credit-status groups of poor and non-poor households.  The comparison between the “Enter” and 
“Never” groups among the poor households indicates that the fertilizer use on non-ILC crops 
increased more by 8.79 kg per acre among “Enter” group than “Never” group.  This difference- 
in-differences indicator is statistically significantly different from zero according to a t-test.  
Among non-poor households, we also find a higher increase in the fertilizer use on non-ILC crops, 
by 5.13 kg per acre, among “Enter” group than “Never” group, but the difference is not statistically 
significant.  These results suggest that poor households are credit constrained and that the access to 
credit helps them to expand their fertilizer use on non-ILC crops; consistent with the physical 
diversion or budget expansion pathway hypotheses. 
  Between the “Both” and “Exit” groups, we do not find significant differences in increases 
in fertilizer use on non-ILC crops from 1997 and 2000.  This could be because households who 
received ILC-credit in 1997 are not credit constrained and can finance fertilizer use on non-ILC 
crops on their own. 
    
4.  Estimation Strategies and Variables  
  The main purpose of this paper is to measure the effects of interlinked credit on fertilizer 
use on other crops (non-ILC crops) that are not part of interlinked credit contracts.
2  The main 
                                                           
2 Feder, et al. (1990) and Kochar (1997) have studied on effects of credit on farm productivity in general.  





problem of estimating the effects of interlinked credit is the selection problem at household and 
village level.  Households who are provided interlinked credit by traders and who agree to 
participate in such arrangements may have unobservable characteristics that are correlated with 
fertilizer use on Non-ILC crops.  Or villages in which traders operate may have good soil quality or 
infrastructure that encourage high fertilizer use on Non-ILC crops.  This selection problem can be 
written as an omitted variables problem. 
  The conditional demand equation for fertilizer use on Non-ILC crops is  
 Y i j t  = Zi j t $B  +  Xi j t $X  +  " i j  +  vj  +  ei j t      ( 1 )  
where Yi j t is the fertilizer nutrient use on Non-ILC crops of household i in village j at time t; Zi j t is 
a dummy variable which is one if  household i has received interlinked credit at time t; Xi j t is a 
vector of household and village characteristics.  The time-invariant unobservable household 
characteristics is " i j, while the time-invariant village characteristics is vj.  The participation of 
interlinked credit, Zi j t, is most likely to be correlated with some of unobservable household and 
village characteristics that are also correlated with the fertilizer use on Non-ILC crops.   
 
  By taking an advantage of panel data, we take the first difference of equation (1) 
 Y i j t+1 - Yi j t = (Zi j t+1 - Zi j t) $B  + (Xi j t+1 - Xi j t) $X  +  ei j t+1 - ei j t.     (2) 
The time-invariant unobservable household and village characteristics are now purged from this 
model.  We first estimate the equation (2) for all sample households and then separately for poor 
and non-poor households to be consistent with descriptive analysis in the previous section.  We 
further stratify the samples by credit status so that we can compare “Neither” against “Enter” and 
“Exit” against “Both.”  These separations may create sample selection biases, but still provide 






  The dependent variable is a change in the fertilizer nutrient use per acre on non-ILC crops 
from 1997 to 2000.  The ILC variable is the change in the dummy variable that takes one if a 
household received ILC credit in a survey year.  This variable is zero among “Neither” and “Both” 
groups, one among “Enter” group, and minus one among “Exit” group.  Two sets of household 
level variables are included in estimations.  The first group represents households’ human 
resources:  the maximum years of schooling of male and female adults, a dummy for 
female-headed households, and demographic attributes.  The second group represents households’ 
financial resources: a dummy for households with land title deed, land owned in acres, total value 
of agricultural assets (e.g., ploughs, ox-carts, bicycles) and animal assets.  Land owned is defined 
as the sum of land that a household claims its ownership with or without title deed.  In the 
estimation models, we use first-differences of these variables from 1997 to 2000.   
 
5. Results  
Spillover Effects 
  Table 5 shows results from the first-differenced models.  The result using the all samples 
indicates that the ILC has a positive but insignificant impact on fertilizer use on non-ILC crops.  
When we stratify the sample into poor and non-poor households based on the 1997 asset level, we 
find a large positive and significant impact on fertilizer nutrient use on non-ILC crops.  The result 
indicates that the ILC increases fertilizer nutrient use by 5.6 kgs per acre on non-ILC crops.  
Because the average fertilizer nutrient use on non-ILC crops is 16.1 kgs per acer among the poor 
households, the result suggest a 35 percent  
In contrast,, however, the ILC does not have a significant impact.  These results are consistent with 
earlier descriptive results and indicate the importance of ILC among the poor households.        




The results indicate that the ILC positively affects fertilizer use on Non-ILC crops. Farmers 
receiving ILC used 15.05 kgs more fertilizer nutrient on non-ILC crops than similar households 
receiving no credit, but this effect is significant only at the 10% significance level (Table 3).  The 
average level of fertilizer use on non-ILC crops is 18.6 kgs among non-borrowers.  Thus the 
estimated coefficient suggests a 81 percent increase in the fertilizer nutrient use on non-ILC crops.  
The contribution of ILC to fertilizer use on non-ILC crops is also twice as large as the naive 
estimate from Table 1. 
  Although the main focus of this paper is on the effects of interlinked credit on non-ILC 
crops through household level credit reception, interlinked credit and other associated factors may 
have impacts on fertilizer use on Non-ILC crops.  For instance, Dione (1991) found that the 
introduction of cotton to Southern Mali increased the demand for fertilizer, which subsequently 
stimulated private investment from input manufacturers, distributors, and retailers.  These 
investments made fertilizer and other inputs more accessible and profitable not only for use on 
cotton (which was the primary impetus for the expansion of input supply in these areas) but also 
for farmers who only produced staple food crops.  This description is consistent with our finding in 
Table 3 that the estimated coefficient of the interaction term between the ILC-village dummy for 
coffee&tea villages and the 2000 year dummy is significantly positive. The interpretation of this 
coefficient is that fertilizer use on Non-ILC crops increased by 18.7 kgs from 29.6 kgs in 1997 in 
villages well-served by both the Kenya Tea Development Authority and coffee cooperatives (these 
are the agents providing ILC for these two crops in Kenya). 
 
6. Conclusions 
  This paper addresses the potential for interlinked credit/input/output marketing 
arrangements for cash crops to promote food crop productivity.  Findings from Kenya suggest that, 




incomes, interlinked input/credit/marketing arrangements may have spillover benefits on the 
productivity of other household activities such as food cropping.  Specifically, our econometric 
panel model results indicate that households engaging in interlinked marketing programs for 
selected cash crops tended to apply considerably greater fertilizer on other crops (primarily 
cereals) not directly purchased by the trading firm providing the ILC.  Especially where there are 
market failures in credit and input markets (which frequently occur in many areas of Africa where 
credit repayment is hindered by firms’ inability to control the output market), farmers’ ability to 
obtain inputs on credit from food crop traders is very constrained.  Participation in cash cropping 
programs may, at least in some cases, allow farmers to overcome such market failures facing food 
crop input and credit supply.  However, whether these complementarities actually materialize 
depends on whether cash cropping firms are able to continue to recoup their up-front costs and 
support farmers through purchase of the cash crop.  A useful analysis of the strategic interactions 
between smallholders and cash crop trading firms is contained in Dorward, Kydd, and Poulton 
(1998).   Along these lines, there is a need for future research to help identify policies and strategic 
partnerships between cash crop firms and governments that might better exploit the potential for 
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Table 1.  Interlinked Credit by Region in 2000 
 
















            
Eastern Lowlands  76 16  6  12 2  4 
Western Lowlands  51 7  6  6 5 1 
Western Transitional  135 46  83 3  40 43 
High Potential Maize Zone  161 32  51 4  23 28 
Western Highlands  145 51  57  24 30 27 
Central Highlands  257 163  183  20  40 143 
Total  825 315  386  69 140  246 
Note: a) Villages where at least one household received interlinked credit from either coffee cooperatives, KTDA, or 








Table 2.  Pathways for Spill-over Effects 
 













Level of Effects  Household  Household  Household  Village 
Among who?  Credit-constrained 
households only 
(as long as implicit 




All Households  All Households 
By ILC-Crops      
  Sugarcane  Likely  Likely  Likely  Likely 
  Coffee  Likely  Likely  Likely  Less likely 
  Tea  Not likely 
(Tea requires NPK 
which is not 
appropriate for 
food crops) 
Likely Not  likely 
(Tea requires NPK 




  Horticulture  Likely  Likely  Likely  Likely 
Note: a) Villages where at least one household received interlinked credit from coffee cooperatives, KTDA, sugar 




Table 3. Fertilizer Nutrient Use on Non-Credit Crops by Changes in ILC Reception 
 
Number of households Poor
a Non-Poor
a  ILC Status





(D) - (E) 





(D) - (E) 
Dif-in-Dif 
 -  Number  -  - Kgs/acre -     - Kgs/acre -    
Neither 177  192  9.6 13.8 +4.3  +8.79  19.4  24.4 +5.0  +5.13 
Enter 73  68 14.8  27.9  +13.1  [2.45]**  26.8  36.9  +10.1 [1.16] 
                   
Exit 35 35  11.9  15.2  +3.3 +7.85  18.7  30.8  +12.1 +0.74 
Both 106 139 13.8  25.0  +11.2 [1.13]  23.6  34.9  +12.3 [0.11] 
ALL 391 434                 
Note: Total number of households is 1,650 (825 households *2 rounds).  Numbers in brackets are absolute t-ratios.  
a) “Poor” households had less than the median asset values in 1997 among all sampled households, while “Non-poor” households had more than the 





Table 4. Fertilizer Nutrient Use on Non-ILC Crops by ILC Reception (Pooled) 
 
Poor Non-Poor  ILC Status 
1997  2000 Dif  Dif-in-Dif 1997  2000 Dif Dif-in-Dif 
Sugarcane Villages            
Neither 0.2  2.0  +1.8  +6.95  4.5  12.5  +7.9 +0.61 
Enter 4.4  13.1  +8.7  [2.09]** 13.9  22.4  +8.6  [0.10] 
Exit  1.0 0.6 -0.4 +8.18  19.3 7.8 -11.4  +29.9 
Ever 2.6  10.2  +7.8  [0.84]  24.1  42.5  +18.4  [1.57] 
Coffee Villages            
Neither 9.6  14.1  +4.5  +18.4  23.9  43.4  +19.5  +2.56 
Enter 15.5  38.4  +22.9  [2.24]** 28.0  44.9  +16.9  [0.27] 
Exit 15,8  24.2  +8.4  -2.48  11.7  29.3  +17.6  +6.71 
Ever 15.0  20.9  +5.9  [0.22]  23.5  34.4  +10.9  [0.48] 
Tea Villages            
Neither 15.8  22.0  +6.2  +7.22  20.4  24.7  +4.2 +3.95 
Enter 25.2  38.6  +13.4  [0.96]  50.5  58.2  +8.2  [0.25] 
Exit 10.6  10.6  0.0  +11.5  19.7  30.0  +10.2  +0.66 
Ever 20.5  36.0  +15.4  [1.30]  23.4  34.2  +10.9  [0.07] 
Horticulture Villages
A            
Neither 6.8  9.4  +2.6    19.7  20.0  0.3  -0.7 
Enter n.a.  n.a.      25.1  24.7  -0.4  [0.18] 
Exit n.a.  n.a.      n.a.  n.a.     
Ever n.a.  n.a.      n.a.  n.a.     
Note: Total number of households is 1,650 (825 households *2 rounds).  Numbers in brackets are absolute t-ratios. * 
indicates 10% significance. ** indicates 5% significance.  A)  ILC credit was not available from horticulture traders in 
1997 among the sample households.  
 




Table 5.  The Spillover Effects of ILC: First-Differenced Models 
 
  All Poor  Non-Poor 
 (A)  (B)  (C) 
ILC Credit     
∆ ILC Received (1/0)  2.704 5.601 1.585 
  (1.20) (1.91)* (0.52) 
Household Human Resources     
∆ Male Max Schooling Years  -0.107 -0.563 -0.095 
  (0.19) (0.63) (0.14) 
∆ Female Max Schooling Years  0.081 1.806 -0.146 
   (0.17) (2.21)** (0.24) 
∆ Female Headed Household (0/1)  1.178 -1.198 3.626 
  (0.35) (0.30) (0.71) 
∆ Number of male adults  -1.098 -1.223 -0.862 
  (1.30) (0.94) (0.80) 
∆ Number of female adults  0.443 1.118 0.231 
  (0.49) (0.87) (0.19) 
∆ Number of Boys age 7-14  -0.221 0.422 0.175 
  (0.21) (0.30) (0.13) 
∆ Number of Girls age 7-14  -0.445 2.127 -1.448 
  (0.42) (1.49) (1.03) 
Household Resources     
∆ Land Tenure (0/1)  0.063 -0.024 0.105 
  (0.61) (0.17) (0.79) 
∆ Land Owned (acres)  3.004 3.248 2.645 
  (1.50) (1.27) (0.95) 
∆ Value of assets (>000 Ksh)  0.000 0.008 -0.000 
  (0.02) (0.17) (0.01) 
Constant (Year 2000)  7.206 7.016 7.304 
  (5.12)** (3.67)** (3.82)** 
R-squared  0.01 0.04 0.01 





Table 6.  The Spillover Effects of ILC- Household Fixed Effects Models 













ILC Credit        
∆ ILC Received (1/0)  7.270 4.761 9.566 8.025 4.796 1.312 
  (2.51)*  (0.94) (2.60)** (1.12)  (1.04)  (0.18) 
Household Human Resources        
∆ Male Max Schooling Years  0.101 -0.427 -0.422 -1.054 0.423 -0.229 
  (0.16) (0.41) (0.41) (0.61) (0.49) (0.17) 
∆ Female Max Schooling Years  -0.225 0.308 -0.185 2.767 -0.106 -1.817 
   (0.37) (0.37) (0.17)  (2.08)*  (0.13)  (1.67)+ 
∆ Female Headed Household   1.803 -0.454 -1.330 -1.469 6.308  9.939 
  (0.47) (0.07) (0.30) (0.19) (0.94) (0.89) 
∆ Number of male adults  -1.018 -1.187 -1.556 -1.100 -0.649 -1.525 
  (1.00) (0.79) (1.02) (0.46) (0.45) (0.78) 
∆ Number of female adults  0.058 1.741 1.328 1.407 -0.622  -0.042 
  (0.05) (1.04) (0.86) (0.59) (0.40) (0.02) 
∆ Number of Boys age 7-14  -1.638 2.787 -1.481 4.327 -1.999 -0.048 
  (1.42) (1.34) (0.98) (1.43) (1.12) (0.02) 
∆ Number of Girls age 7-14  0.561 -1.504 2.293 2.915 -0.732 -7.040 
  (0.46) (0.75) (1.41) (1.01) (0.40)  (2.41)* 
Household Resources        
∆ Land Tenure (0/1)  0.023 0.044 -0.088 0.063 0.076 0.382 
  (0.20) (0.21) (0.48) (0.27) (0.48) (0.70) 
∆ Land Owned (acres)  1.721 5.224 0.711 7.982 3.114 0.399 
  (0.73) (1.44) (0.24) (1.60) (0.82) (0.08) 
∆ Value of assets (>000 Ksh)  0.003 -0.007 -0.025 0.010 0.001 -0.018 
  (0.30) (0.37) (0.32) (0.14) (0.13) (0.87) 
Constant (Year 2000)  3.930 11.499 4.602 11.867 3.422  9.868 
  (2.20)* (4.00)** (1.99)* (2.73)**  (1.19)  (2.47)* 
R-squared  0.02 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.07 
# of observations  508 313 249 141 259 172 
 